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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS and 
JAMES R. WILLIAMS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 890418-CA 
Priority No. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
APPELLANTfS REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT I 
Plaintiff argues that the initial entry of judgment was 
proper: that at the time the stipulation was entered "the terms 
were clear and uncomplicated;" that a "signed" stipulation was 
submitted to the court; that defendant "did not request a hearing 
on this matter;" and "the fact of defendant's default is not 
contested." (Respondent's Brief page 2-3) The record demonstrates 
the inaccuracy of every one of these propositions. 
First and foremost, without belaboring the point, from the 
stipulation that plaintiff had prepared to plaintiff's verified 
motion for judgment, to the judgment itself, plaintiff insisted on 
naming Robert Williams as the named defendant, as the named subject 
of the stipulation, as the named subject of the motion for judgment 
and as the person against whom judgment would be and was entered. 
That was obvious error and defendant attempted (with futility) to 
point the error out. There is no question that plaintiff's 
verified motion seeking judgment against Robert Williams should 
have been denied. 
Defendant did and continues to contest the "fact of default;" 
defendant raised several arguments in its opposition to entry of 
judgment (see Record pages 36-37) including the fact that defendant 
had tendered a sum that would have made all payments current 
according to plaintiff's version or understanding of the 
stipulation, notwithstanding defendant's position that the oral 
stipulation contemplated that a written stipulation setting forth 
the dates and amounts of payments would be prepared before said 
payments would become due; defendant's understanding of what was 
contemplated by the oral stipulation is supported by the fact that 
there was n^ reference as to specific amounts or the dates 
installment payments were due in the discussions before the court 
indicating that an agreement had been reached (no specific 
stipulation, per sef was read into the record, see transcript of 
proceedings September 16, 1988). 
Additionally, the terms of the oral stipulation were not 
clear, though the agreement generally was uncomplicated. It was 
specifically contemplated that the agreement would be reduced to 
writing and clear terms based on the general understanding. When 
the Court inquired as to who would prepare "the judgment" (page 7, 
line 22-23 transcript of September 16, 1988 proceedings), Ms. 
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Denholm specifically responded that she would prepare the documents 
(page 7, line 24, transcript of September 16, 1988 proceedings), 
not a "judgment" and not a single document, but plural, more than 
one document; that was because the parties and counsel understood 
that in addition to an order or judgment there would a written 
agreement or stipulation. 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant never "requested" a hearing 
on the motion for entry of judgment. Defendant was never given an 
opportunity to request a hearing! No request or notice to submit 
for decision was filed. Without notice to the parties, or at least 
without notice to defendant or his counsel, on the second working 
day after defendant timely filed his objection to entry of judgment 
(actually, defendant had until five p. m. the day that the trial 
court signed the judgment to file a response) , the trial court 
summarily granted judgment. The trial court as much as admits that 
when it did so it was "asleep." (See record at page 61) If the 
trial court was asleep when it came to defendant's most obvious and 
simple objection, what consideration can defendant infer his other 
arguments received? Defendant was not even accorded the relatively 
abbreviated procedures set forth in Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration. Due process as guaranteed by the 
Constitutions of both Utah and the United States was denied the 
defendant. 
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II 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II 
Plaintiff argues that its Rule 60(a) motion to amend the 
judgment was properly granted. That motion asserted that the 
judgment bore a "clerical" error and that the clerical error should 
be corrected. Allowing, for the sake of brevity of argument only, 
that the identity of the party on a judgment could be a clerical 
error (one having such devastating, substantive implications to the 
aggrieved person, that it should not be considered as "clerical"), 
it would be clerical only when an incorrect name different from the 
name of the party appearing on the pleadings leading to the 
granting of judgment, was mistakenly typed in. Robert Williams 
name appeared throughout all of plaintiff's pleadings seeking 
judgment, from stipulation to verified motion. The name that 
appeared on the judgment was the same as plaintiff had sought 
judgment against. It was error, certainly, and defendant 
succinctly pointed the error out. It was not clerical error, 
however, and therefore the motion to amend should have been denied. 
Plaintiff argues that "an error in the caption is not material 
to the substance of the agreement." That is hardly the question. 
The only place the defendant is identified in plaintiff's pleadings 
seeking judgment is in the caption of both the "stipulation" (not 
signed by either defendant or counsel, see Record 40-41) and the 
verified motion; only Robert Williams is there identified. Counsel 
for defendant respectfully submits that plaintiff is in error, that 
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there is nothing more material or substantive than the identity of 
a party against whom a pleading or more particularly a judgment is 
directed. There is no indicia whatsoever in plaintiff's pleadings 
that they are directed to any one other than Robert Williams! (No 
"et al" in the caption, and so on.) 
Plaintiff argues that the error and the amendment were not 
"prejudicial" to James Williams. It was plaintiff's sloth and 
plaintiff's refusal to acknowledge the mistake in the written 
version of the stipulation as to the identity of the responsible, 
liable party that led to the disagreement and the withholding of 
payment in the first place! It was plaintiff who declined tendered 
payments from James Williams. Regarding which James Williams never 
had the opportunity to address the trial court because, first, he 
was not the subject of the motion before the court when judgment 
was granted (Robert was) , and secondly because the defendant never 
had the opportunity provided by Rule 4-501 Rules of Judicial 
Administration to seek a hearing! All of which has resulted in a 
judgment for more than fifty thousand dollars against, first Robert 
Williams and later against James Williams. There was prejudice, 
indeed! 
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the trial court "clearly shows 
that it read" defendant's objection. The record itself shows that 
the trial court ignored defendant's objection, for despite the 
objection's clear, absolutely accurate point that Robert Williams 
was not the proper party, the trial court granted a motion against 
Robert Williams and signed a judgment against Robert Williams. 
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While a great deal of deference is due the trial court, it would 
be stretching rational standards of review beyond any sensible 
application to overlook the trial court's overlooking of an error 
pointed out so specifically. Reasonable persons can only infer 
that the trial court did not read the defendant's objection, 
III 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II 
Appellant urges, inter alia, that the trial court also erred 
at the April 1988 pretrial when it compelled defendant to elect 
between the risk of contempt and jail or stipulate that he had 
signed a personal guarantee. Plaintiff argues that the threat of 
jail made by the trial court was in the context of a citation for 
"contempt" aimed at "misconduct," arising out of a "heated 
exchange" between counsel and the trial court. Plaintiff's 
characterization is entirely inaccurate and conclusively disputed 
by the transcript of the pretrial proceedings. 
Counsel admits that the demeanor of the trial court was 
impatient and perhaps "heated." That was obvious from the first, 
in the tone and manner of the trial court's inquiry following 
counsel's identification of James Williams: the court brusquely 
asked "What does he have to do with it?" (pretrial transcript page 
2 line 10) It was not so much the question itself, which implied 
that the court was not familiar with the status or parties in the 
case (although at that date the court's file consisted of twenty 
pages only)
 f but its tone that caused counsel for defendant to be 
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stunned (being surprised at the court's apparent ire) and at a loss 
of words to the point that it was counsel for plaintiff that 
responded to the inquiry directed to counsel for the defendant 
(pretrial transcript page 2 line 11-12) . 
This counsel will confess that on that occasion he was 
inarticulate, unpersuasive and even slow in responding to the trial 
court's inquiries. In defense, however, this counsel will also 
urge that the trial court was impatient and seemed to have already 
decided the case even though it was not familiar with its status 
or the nature of the parties. The trial court seemed to believe 
that defense counsel had or should have completed discovery (see 
the trial court's statement at the top of page 6 of the pretrial 
transcript)
 f even though a brief review of the twenty pages of the 
record would have informed the court that while the defense had 
responded to plaintiff's discovery requests, the defense had 
elected to not pursue discovery. (There is nothing in the Rules of 
Civil Procedure mandating that a party expend legal costs in 
pursuing discovery.) Counsel did not anticipate having to argue 
persuasively at pretrial the merits and weight of evidence, 
particularly as the majority of defendant's defenses were related 
to the denial of several factual allegations and the application 
of law to the facts, actually to the lack of facts in that the 
defense anticipated that plaintiff would be unable to meet its 
burden of proof as to many of the allegations (particularly as to 
whether there was a personal guarantee or that defendant had agreed 
to be responsible for the debts of the third party corporation). 
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Counsel was immediately inhibited by the court's apparent 
hostility; thereafter counsel's efforts to explain defendant's 
position were repeatedly cutoff (counsel was interrupted on at 
least a dozen occasions in the brief pretrial; see pretrial 
transcript page 3 line 7, page 5 line 13, page 6 line 14, page 7 
line 2, page 7 line 22, page 8 line 7, page 9 line 7, page 10 line 
12, line 14, line 21, page 11 line 20, page 12 line 7). Counsel 
was hampered, if not stymied, by the trial court's effort at 
pretrial to hear the evidence, judge its weight and make findings: 
THE COURT: Now, you have a guarantee. 
MISS DENHOLM: Yes, we do. 
THE COURT: Was there ever a cancellation of the 
guarantee? 
MISS DENHOLM: No. 
THE COURT: You are claiming this is a cancellation, 
then, of the guarantee. 
MR. LINDSLEY: We are claiming, as a matter of fact, 
there was a cash on delivery relationship that occurred 
prior to 1983 between the corporate entity and the 
plaintiff. 
THE COURT: Doesn't make any difference, does it? 
Does it make any difference to a guarantee if you leave 
the guarantee in effect? 
MR. LINDSLEY: Well, first of all, first defense is 
that there's no guarantee from James Williams. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me see the guarantee. Okay. 
Show it to counsel. Does it have his name on it? 
MR. LINDSLEY: I am not sure that does. 
THE COURT: Well, you show it to me. Does it have 
his name on it? 
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MISS DENHOLM: Yes. Well, we believe it does. 
Signature is identical to other signatures. 
THE COURT: Okay. Simple matter. Is that your 
signature on there? 
MR. WILLIAMS: It could be. I don't recall signing 
that ever. 
THE COURT: Doesn't matter. Look at it and tell me 
if that's your signature. 
MR. WILLIAMS: It could be my signature. 
THE COURT: Does it look to be somebody's else's 
signature. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Probably not. 
THE COURT: Then that's not a defense, is it? 
MR. LINDSLEY: In the admissions we denied that 
that's a personal guarantee. 
THE COURT: That doesn't matter. 
(Pre-trial Transcript Page 7-9) 
The document referred to as the "guarantee" is found in the 
record at page 3 and 14, and is also in the addendum of appellant's 
brief. Although the trial court repeatedly referred to the 
document as a "guarantee" it was not a guarantee and it had not 
been relied on by plaintiff in extending credit. The following are 
observations arising from a brief review of the subject document 
and the trial court record up to the date of the pretrial: 
1. Plaintiff attached a copy of the same document to its 
original complaint and alleged that it was an agreement executed 
by Robert Williams. (And by inference, plaintiff was alleging that 
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it had relied on Robert Williams1 promise to personally be 
responsible for the debts of the corporation.) (Record page 1-3) 
2. It was purportedly executed in April of 1979, five years 
prior to the insolvency of the corporation and its dissolution, 
more than eight years prior to plaintiff's filing a complaint 
against James Williams, and more than nine years prior to the 
pretrial. (Record page 3, page 12-14) 
3. The signature is illegible. (Record page 3 and page 14) 
4. The name printed on the form is that of Robert Williams. 
(Record page 3 and 14) 
5. The address and telephone identified as "home" on the 
document next to the signature were those of Robert Williams. 
(Record page 3 and 14) 
6. The form is blank in the space provided to identify the 
party to whom credit is being advanced, the "debtor" whose debts 
are being guaranteed. (Record page 3 and 14) 
Counsel for defendant held the opinion that evidence at trial 
would show not only that the plaintiff did not rely on a promise 
of James Williams in extending credit, but plaintiff did not 
perceive or believe the illegible signature on the "credit 
application" to be James Williams' until several years after the 
last extension of credit to the corporation, until after the 
corporation was insolvent and had been dissolved, until after its 
lawsuit against Robert Williams was being dismissed. 
The court repeatedly responded to statements or proffers of 
counsel and/or James Williams with comments like: "That's not a 
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defensef is it?" (pretrial transcript page 9 line 5) "That doesn't 
matter." (pretrial transcript page 9 line 8) "You cannot waste time 
just because you want to waste time." (pretrial transcript page 11 
line 9-10 and line 23, page 9 line 14,) The trial court's cross-
examination of defendant (pretrial transcript page 8 line 20 to 
page 9 line 5) conjoined with the above, conjoined with the court's 
demeanor and the repeated interruptions of counsel, culminated by 
the trial court admonishing counsel that jail was guaranteed if 
counsel persisted in denying that there was a personal guarantee: 
the totality of circumstances make it clear that the court was 
assuring counsel and defendant that to raise the issue and lose on 
it was going to entail sanctions far more severe than those 
provided for in the rules of civil procedure, that the court would 
find someone in contempt and impose jail. That was error. That 
denied defendant due process. 
The trial court was not familiar with the status of the case 
nor the nature of the parties, at the commencement of the pretrial, 
and the trial court still was not familiar with the identity or 
nature of the parties eight months later when it signed a judgment 
against Robert Williams. Counsel was not playing games and 
counsel had no intention of "wasting" the court's time: counsel did 
intend to contest whether there was a personal guarantee, to 
contest if and when the alleged debt occurred and by whom, to 
contest the delay in pursuing a claim against James Williams 
(pursuant to both statute of limitations and the doctrine of 
laches). 
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The trial court's threatened invocation of incarceration for 
contesting an issue (which constituted questions of fact and of 
law) epitomized the trial court's demeanor in the pretrial: the 
defendant was indeed intimidated and denied due process. 
Counsel does not suggest any malice on the part of the trial 
court. Counsel does not suggest that the trial court intended to 
deny defendant due process. To err is human and judges can and do 
err. This counsel had appeared frequently before the Honorable 
Judge Cornaby before the referenced pretrial and has continued to 
frequently appear before the same court. Professional disagreement 
both as to fact and as to interpretation of law has and continues 
to occur in some cases. Counsel also admits that if, on the 
occasion of the pretrial, he had been more articulate, more quickly 
responsive, the problem may have been avoided. But it did happen 
and Mr. James Williams paid for it by a loss of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court below repeatedly denied James Williams an 
opportunity to be heard, from the coercion to stipulate that he had 
signed the credit application, to the failure to comply with Rule 
4-501 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and granting 
plaintiff's verified motion without hearing or an opportunity for 
defendant to request a hearing, to the trial court's sua sponte 
amendment of plaintiff's verified motion and granting of an amended 
judgment based upon that. The lack of a written stipulation or an 
order reflecting and adopting the oral stipulation was due to 
12 
plaintiff's negligence, in part, and in plaintiff's persistence in 
placing Robert Williams name as the responsible party. James 
Williams had tendered performance which plaintiff rejected (see 
defendant's objection Record at 36). The totality of circumstances 
reflect a denial of due process and reversible error. The amended 
judgment should be reversed and ordered set aside. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1990. 
William H. Lindsley 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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